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Major League Baseball managers are often blamed for the poor
performance of a baseball team. In the past two years alone, there
have been eight midseason managerial firings and six postseason
managerial firings. While this number may seem high, these numbers
have actually been consistent with probabilities of managerial
retention since 1930, when baseball was still in the early stages of its
development as a professional sport. In the following study, I examine
the factors that are taken into account during these managerial firing
decisions and what conditions are present when changes do take
place. Using Major League Baseball managerial data from 1988-2011,
I find that poor team performance with respect to other teams in its
division, consecutive seasons of losing records, high age of the
manager, and the presence of an interim tag on the manager are all
factors that decrease the likelihood that a manager will be retained.
On the other hand, recent success at the highest level, in the form of a
World Series championship, increases the likelihood of a manager
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In a game of baseball, a manager has a limited number of resources at
his disposal. An effective manager allocates his scarce resources so as
to maximize their potential output. Before and during a game, a
manager must make many decisions about how to use his players so
that their production matches their potential. These strategic decisions
include, but are not limited to, determining a batting order, deciding
on appropriate times to bunt or steal, and efficiently utilizing the
team’s relief pitching.
In many ways, a baseball manager acts as an on-field CEO. Just as a
CEO is responsible for the day-to-day success of a company, the
baseball manager is responsible for the day-to-day success of a
baseball team on the field.
Furthermore, a manager must be able to play the role of player
motivator, emotional leader, team cheerleader, and team psychologist.
Baseball researcher Chris Jaffe (2010) notes, “Managers are first and
foremost managers of men.“ Just as he must make sound on-field
decisions so that his players produce to their maximum potential, he
must also lead so that his players are in a motivated, invested, and
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confident emotional state to perform. In order to be successful, the
manager must make sound decisions in all areas.
At the same time, however, without sufficient resources, a team will
not win. The output of these resources, the players that comprise a
team’s roster, is the primary determining factor in whether or not a
team will be successful. If a team does not have good players, the
manager can only do so much to overcome this inherent disadvantage.
His contributions, although numerous, are, at the same time, limited.
In most instances, despite a manager’s motivational tactics or in-game
strategy, the team with the players that play the best will win the
game.
While a manager generally has some say in the acquisition of talent,
the responsibility for these decisions is spread out across an
organization. Upper management and a franchise’s scouting
department are equally involved in these decisions, if not more so,
than a team’s on-field manager. In some extreme cases, the manager
is completely left out of the decision-making process in acquiring the
personnel that he will be responsible for managing. There is the
famous scene shared by Michael Lewis (2003) in Moneyball: The Art of
Winning an Unfair Game, in which we are taken into the Oakland
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Athletics’ war room on the day of the Major League Baseball Amateur
Draft in 2002. Lewis’s work allows us to examine the inner workings of
the Oakland Athletics and the player acquisition philosophy of general
manager Billy Beane. Repeatedly, Lewis unveils the separation
between Beane and Oakland’s manager Art Howe. This strained
relationship is never more apparent than in the scene on draft day
when Beane, other executives, and his scouting department are
together in the war room. Howe arrives just before Oakland’s first
round selection is about to be made, stands quietly in the back of the
room, and contributes nothing to the decision making process. It is
Beane and his scouts that make the decisions entirely, yet the field
manager often takes a significant portion of the blame when events on
the field go badly. In fact, Art Howe was fired and replaced by Ken
Macha the following offseason.
To be fair, a portion of the blame for this firing was attributable to a
difference in game management philosophy between Howe and Beane.
Still, Howe’s lack of contribution to player personnel decisions is
noteworthy. It can be assumed that all Major League teams share a
similar decision making hierarchy. While not all field managers are as
absent in the process as Howe, there is no doubt that there is an
allocation of influence to be seen in the process. With this in mind, a
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team’s success is highly dependent on the ability of a team’s scouting
department and its general manager.
Even more importantly, the level of player talent can only reach a
certain level over a consistent length of time if a team’s ownership is
not willing to invest in it. The absence of a salary cap in Major League
Baseball makes it a reality that in most cases, not taking into account
the variation in the ability of talent scouts across organizations, the
owner willing to spend the most money will have the best players.
From 2004-2008, organizations in the top 10 percent of payrolls for
their Major League team reached the playoffs eighty percent of the
time.1 In contrast, organizations in the bottom fifty percent of payrolls
only made the playoffs thirteen percent of the time. While there are
numerous examples during this time period of small market teams
outperforming expectations and earning playoff berths, the numbers
indicate that a higher payroll leads to a much greater likelihood of
team success.
Even so, an on-field manager is often blamed for his team’s failures
when the talent level of his players is comparatively low. In 2010
1 Salary information is taken from the USA Today online MLB salary database found at
http://content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/baseball/mlb/salaries/team.
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alone, six different franchises made midseason managerial changes,
with the Baltimore Orioles making two. With the exception of Lou
Piniella’s retirement from the Chicago Cubs, all were performance
related firings. Five of the other six franchises can be found in the
bottom half of the league’s payrolls. At the end of the 2010 season,
there were three more performance related firings, three retirements,
and one interim manager hired in the middle of the 2010 season that
was not retained. The New York Mets, with the 6th highest payroll, the
Milwaukee Brewers, with the 18th highest payroll, and the Pittsburgh
Pirates, with the lowest payroll, all made performance related
decisions.
Pittsburgh dismissed field manager John Russell after three seasons, in
which he produced a combined record of 186-299 with the lowest
payroll in the National League Central Division in all three seasons. For
the most part, a team with such a low payroll is comprised of either
veterans with a relatively low talent level, aging veterans at the very
back end of their careers, or talented young players without enough
experience at the Major League level to be offered arbitration or free
agency. These three groups of players all have deficiencies in the form
of lack of talent, diminishing skills, or lack of experience. With
Pittsburgh’s ownership investing to such a small degree in players,
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some would argue that Russell won just as many games as expected.
For a comparison to the rest of the league, the New York Yankees,
baseball’s biggest spender in 2010, had a total payroll almost nine
times greater than that of the Pittsburgh Pirates. Even in their own
division, the St. Louis Cardinals outspent the Pirates by 2.34 million
dollars per player on the twenty-five man roster. Still, however, blame
was placed on the field manager for the team’s failure to win.
The recently completed 2011 season saw more managerial changes.
The Oakland Athletics, Florida Marlins, and Washington Nationals all
made midseason swaps, although the decisions in Florida and
Washington were classified as resignations. While Florida’s change was
seen as performance related, Washington’s situation was mainly
dependent on their refusal to discuss a contract extension with
manager Jim Riggleman in the middle of the season. Again, these
decisions were made with poorly performing teams with low payrolls.
Oakland’s payroll was the tenth lowest in baseball in 2011, while
Florida made a midseason change for the second consecutive year,
this time with the league’s seventh lowest payroll.
At the end of 2011, there were three more performance related firings.
Mike Quade, just one full year into his tenure with the Chicago Cubs,
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was dismissed when a new general management group arrived. The
Chicago White Sox made a managerial change, and the Boston Red
Sox fired Terry Francona, after narrowly missing the playoffs with the
third highest paid team in Major League Baseball.
With all of these recent situations in mind and looking back at the
entire history of Major League Baseball, it is obvious that many times
the manager takes the brunt of the punishment for a team’s failures
on the field. Whether those responsible for hiring and firing decisions
believe that the manager is actually at fault or that there just needs to
be a public show of reprimand remains to be seen. All of this leads to
the question of what circumstances are needed for a manager to be
dismissed. What causes a manager to get fired? Is it a prolonged
period of losing seasons? Is it a streak of seasons without a playoff
berth? Is it being at the helm of a team that fails to meet expectations
as put forth by ownership? Is it being around when fans stop buying
tickets to come to the ballpark? Just in the previous two seasons, we
have seen a manager get fired for guiding the lowest paid team in
baseball to another last place finish and the manager of a team with
World Series expectations be dismissed for failing to lead his team to
the playoffs. To be sure, the conditions in which dismissals occur are
various.
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In hopes of analyzing these conditions further, the thesis will proceed
as follows. In Section II, I will summarize the literature performed on
CEO turnover to date. This CEO turnover literature will be valuable in
that it will show us what circumstances are present during the
dismissal of managers and leaders outside of the baseball world and
then compare these practices to the treatment of Major League
Baseball managers. In Section III, I will present a brief history of field
managers in Major League baseball. In Section IV, I will introduce
some statistics on tenure length of managers, and in Section V I will
develop a model of the probability of manager retention.
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II. BACKGROUND LITERATURE
A baseball manager and a company’s CEO are similar in their
responsibilities and goals. A baseball manager is charged to make
decisions that will enable his resources, his players, to produce at their
maximum output, which in turn will determine the overall success of
the team represented in the form of the win/loss record. As the
players perform at a higher level, the team will win more games and
the manager will be seen as having been successful. Similarly, a CEO
is responsible for making decisions in hopes of producing the
maximum earnings for his company. Just as a manager is judged
almost entirely on winning percentage, a CEO is judged on the
company’s bottom line.
Also, both positions are under significant pressure from various outside
parties to produces success in these areas. A manager faces pressure
from his team’s fan base who desire wins and championships, and a
CEO faces pressure from his company’s stockholders, who desire
profits. Both of these groups, the fans and stockholders, also have the
power to apply pressure to those making hiring and firing decisions.
The fans apply it in the form of decreased ticket sales, while the
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stockholders will sell shares. In either form, these actions affect the
decision makers financially and oftentimes bring about change.
With all of these similarities, it is useful to first consider the economic
research that has already been performed regarding CEO turnover,
when examining the dynamics of Major League Baseball manager
turnover.
As expected, many studies have found that the likelihood of CEO
turnover is driven, to some degree, by firm performance. (Coughlan
and Schmidt, 1985; Warner, et al, 1988,; Weisbach, 1988; and
Parrino, 1997) In short, a CEO is less likely to be retained when his
firm is performing poorly. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) use stock
price performance from 1977-1980 to analyze the likelihood of CEO
turnover under different conditions. They find that a firm’s board will
use the threat of compensation changes and the threat of termination
to control top executives, and, using the stock price data as an
indicator, find that when a firm is performing poorly enough, the CEO
will be dismissed. Similarly, Warner, et al (1988) find that the
probability that a top executive will be retained and the firm’s stock
performance have a direct relationship.
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This is, of course, to be expected. A CEO cannot expect to save his job
when his firm is not successful financially. Research also finds,
however, that CEOs at poorly performing firms are still less likely to be
retained even when they make business decisions that are comparable
to decisions made by their counterparts in similar firms. (Khanna and
Poulsen, 1995; Farrell and Whidbee, 2002) Even when the decisions
made by poorly performing CEOs closely resemble the decisions of
CEOs in charge of highly successfully firms, the poorly performing
CEOs are likely to still be dismissed.
Similarly, there is congruence in the ideas and behavior of Major
League managers. Just as an example, lineups are constructed
similarly. Speed is placed at the top with power in the middle and the
weakest hitters at the bottom. Bullpens are also utilized similarly. In
just the last twenty years, the roles of relief pitchers have become
increasingly specialized. Almost every team has one player designated
as the closer, a pitcher who throws the last inning of a game in which
his team is leading. Many teams have left-handed pitchers whose sole
job is to retire one left-handed hitter a game. To be sure, the thinking
of MLB managers across the board is similar in many other ways, as
well. They all make similar in-game decisions, yet several are still fired
every year.
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While the impact of firm performance on CEO turnover is statistically
significant, the quantitative effect is relatively small. “The typical study
finds that moving from the top to bottom decile of performance
increases the probability of CEO turnover in publicly traded firms by
about 4 percent.” (Brickley, 2003) A more predictive variable for the
probability of CEO turnover seems to be the age of the CEO. Murphy
(1999) proposes that the likelihood of a CEO leaving his position is
almost 30 percent higher when the CEO is 64 years of age or older. In
a similar study, Farrell and Whidbee (2003) also find that the age of a
CEO plays a role in the likelihood that the CEO will return the following
year. In their study, they find that the sixty years of age mark is a
predictive indicator for the likelihood of CEO turnover.
Another significant portion of the same study suggests that deviation
from expected performance is a more important determinant in CEO
turnover than firm performance absent of expectations. They find that
boards make their decisions based on earnings forecasts and are more
likely to release a CEO when the firm’s performance falls short of these
expectations, especially when there is consensus among analysts.
This is an interesting topic to explore with regards to MLB managers. It
would seem logical that a manager would be more likely to be
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dismissed when his team is predicted to finish high in the standings or
has a high payroll yet performs poorly. This would especially seem
understandable if there were many groups, from media analysts to
fans to players, expecting greater results without actually seeing a
high number of wins on the field.
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III. MANAGERIAL HISTORY
In the early days of professional baseball, managers were often more
along the lines of team captains. A majority of managers on these
teams played while serving as manager at the same time. In these
days, the manager was responsible for filling out the lineup card daily
and other managerial duties, but, at the same time, he was there to
primarily be a playing member of the team and contribute to wins and
losses with his on-field play. The first manager of a professional
baseball team was a playing manager named Charles “Pop” Snyder,
who took over the Cincinnati Red Stockings at the age of 27. While
managing, he also served as Cincinnati’s catcher and even led the
league in putouts by a catcher.
Depken (2011) notes that this model, however, which was common in
the early days of professional baseball was almost entirely eliminated
by 1956: “From 1871 through 1955, player-managers comprised 41%
of all managerial positions…After 1955, the player manager was a
rarity; only ten player-managers served from 1956 through 2009
comprising 0.6% of all managerial positions.” Depken (2011) also
finds that these player-managers were not any more or less successful
than their non-playing counterparts. He did find, however, that when
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these players managed, the quality of their play on the field suffered.
Since these players were often some of the most skilled on their team,
having these players serve in a managerial role led to a high
opportunity cost. As this cost increased, the presence of the player-
manager was largely eliminated. With the elimination of the player
manager, Major League managers today are much older and much
farther removed from their playing days. The average age of a Major
League manager is 2011 was 55.39 years, and this number has been
trending upward, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1.
Just as the age of the young player-manager is gone, the days of the
long-tenured manager serving one team are becoming scarce. In the
previous decade, excluding the tenures of managers who took over
midseason as interim managers, the average tenure of a Major League
manager was 3.33 years.2 While this tenure length is not as short as it
was in the 1980s, it is still lower than the average length of 5.05 years
that was seen in the 1940s.  Table 2 presents these decade by decade
tenure lengths.
In 2011, the longest serving manager with one club was Tony LaRussa
of the St. Louis Cardinals, who led the team for 16 consecutive
2 All information on managerial tenure lengths was compiled using a baseball database compiled by Sean
Lahman found at http://baseball1.com/2011/01/baseball-database-updated-2010/.
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seasons. He retired after winning the World Series this past season,
making Mike Scioscia, who is entering his 13th consecutive season
with the St. Louis Cardinals, the new longest tenured manager with
one club in baseball. Bill James, (1997) the famous baseball
researcher, attempts to provide reasoning for the relatively short
tenure of a Major League manager by saying, “The most important
question that a manager asks is ‘what needs to be changed around
here?’ Any manager, over time, loses the ability to see what needs to
be changed.” As such, a manager’s tenure is not interminable.
Some general managers or owners that make managerial hiring and
firing decisions take this idea to the extreme. George Steinbrenner in
his first twenty-three years as owner of the New York Yankees
oversaw twenty managerial changes, including the dismissal of Billy
Martin on five different occasions.
In this case, differing views on baseball strategy and player treatment
between Martin and Steinbrenner was the overriding factor in the
retention decisions. Winning seemed to be a secondary factor as the
Yankees were relatively successful with Martin at the helm winning two
American League pennants and one World Series championship, and
posting a winning record in every season. Still, Billy Martin and George
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Steinbrenner regularly feuded over various daily operations of the
team. They disagreed on lineups, motivational tactics, and treatment
of players.
While winning is important, the Steinbrenner era in New York and
other historical examples suggest that the absence of a collaborative,
harmonious work environment between a field manager and upper
management can contribute to a shorter managerial tenure. There are
many responsibilities of a field manager, both on the field and off, and,
consequently, many areas for the two parties to disagree. One of a
manager’s many roles, and the most important in the eyes of many, is
that of team leader. There are many different approaches to this
leadership role and different strategies for getting the most production
out of the pieces of a ball club. There are disciplinarians, and then
there are “player managers”. One of the rifts between Billy Martin and
George Steinbrenner was Martin’s tough approach to team discipline,
in particular his uncompromising treatment of star players such as
Reggie Jackson.
On the other hand, Bobby Cox managed twenty consecutive seasons in
Atlanta before his retirement at the end of the 2010 season, in large
part due to his team’s on-field success, but also because ownership
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agreed with his leadership style that led to a more relaxed clubhouse
atmosphere.
Along with these leadership styles, managers develop their own
identifiable in-game strategy styles, as well. There are different lineup
building strategies, different strategies for handling the offensive side
of the game (when to bunt, steal, hit and run, etc.), different
strategies for handling a team’s relief pitching, and so much more.
Agreement on these issues between a front office and manager is
important, as well. From 1968 to 1982 and again from 1985 to 1986,
Earl Weaver managed the Baltimore Orioles with a philosophy
dependent on pitching, defense, and the three run homer. As such, he
rarely bunted or attempted to steal bases. Using the logic that an
offensive team is given a limited and scarce number of outs in a game,
he instead chose to play for runs by allowing his players to hit. As
such, he had a reluctance to hand potentially free outs to the
opposition by bunting, stealing, or using the hit-and-run. Weaver
(2002) writes, "There are only three (outs) an inning, and they should
be treasured. It's such a basic fact that fans sometimes forget it, but
an inning doesn't last fifteen minutes or six batters or twenty pitches;
it lasts three outs. Give one away and you're making everything
harder for yourself." Upper management agreed with his philosophy
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and allowed him to practice it over the course of seventeen Major
League seasons. They also provided him with the offensive weapons
necessary to execute this philosophy, sluggers like Eddie Murray and
Frank Robinson. As a result, the Baltimore Orioles won four American
League pennants, one World Series title, and posted a losing record
only once over the length of Earl Weaver’s tenure.
Furthermore, Weaver agreed with the thinking that a manager could
only be as successful on the field as his talent would allow him to be.
Weaver (2002) goes on to say, "The home run makes managing
simple. Frank Robinson would come to bat with two guys on base. I'd
yell, 'Hit it hard, Frank.' Frank would hit it hard and far, over the
fence. Then he would come around the bases and back into the
dugout. I'd say, 'Nice hit, Frank.' Now that is the ideal way to
manage...Give me a lineup full of Frank Robinsons, Eddie Murrays,and
Brooks Robinsons and I'll show you how simple managing can be." As
seen by the results on the field and Weaver's lengthy tenure with
Baltimore, upper management agreed with this philosophy.
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IV. TENURE ANALYSIS
It is hard to measure the impact of a manager’s relationships with
ownership, his baseball philosophies, his treatment of players, or his
off-field behavior on the length of managerial tenures. The impact of a
manager’s win/loss record is, on the other hand, much more easily
quantified. Even managers who peacefully co-exist with management
and treat their players well will not manage the same team forever
without a degree of on-field success, in the form of wins, playoff
appearances, and championships. The question becomes how much
success is needed to guarantee job security and how has this changed
over time.
In order to gain some understanding of exactly how volatile Major
League managerial jobs are and how this volatility has changed over
time, Table 3 and Figure 2 show the percentage of teams that made
managerial changes year by year since 1930. These statistics do not
take into account midseason managerial changes; however, a change
is noted if the manager of a team at the start of a year is different
than the manager that started the previous year for the same team.
Since 1930, the average percentage of managers that were replaced in
a given year is 19.5 percent. The 2011 offseason saw a number only
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slightly higher than that with 23.3 percent of jobs changing hands. The
figure presented shows a fluctuation in managerial changes from year
to year, with no real trend emerging. Perhaps surprisingly, it appears
that a manager is just as likely to keep his job from one year to the
next now as he was in the early stages of the game’s history back in
1930.
Certainly, different franchises have different philosophies on their
manager retention plans. Table 4 provides a summary of franchise
tenure lengths.  For simplicity, today’s franchises encompass all of its
previous forms.  For example, statistics on the Los Angeles Dodgers
include tenure lengths from managers for the Brooklyn Dodgers, as
well.  For the most part, franchises make these decisions based on the
level of success achieved by the team. What constitutes success,
however, is different for each team. A winning season may provide
reason for celebration in the case of many small-market teams. On the
other hand, the wealthiest teams with the biggest payrolls, such as the
New York Yankees, will not consider a season a success unless it ends
with them celebrating a World Series victory. As such, managerial
tenure lengths vary greatly from team to team. Perhaps surprisingly,
the team with the lowest average managerial tenure is the Florida
Marlins, a team located in a midsize market. Excluding midseason
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replacements, the managers of the Florida Marlins are only on the
bench for an average of two seasons. A small market franchise, the
Kansas City Royals, is right behind them with an average managerial
tenure of 2.2 years. The Los Angeles Dodgers, a relatively large
market team, have the longest average managerial tenure with an
average of 5.7 years. This number is aided by the lengthy and
successful tenures of Walter Alston and Tommy Lasorda. Alston
managed the Dodgers for twenty-two consecutive seasons beginning
in 1954. Over the length of his tenure, he won an average of 89
games a year, won four World Series championships, and never posted
a losing record. Lasorda replaced Alston as manager with four games
remaining in the 1976 season and amazingly remained in this position
for the next nineteen seasons. While unable to replicate Alston’s level
of consistent success, Lasorda still managed to win two World Series
titles.
Out of his nineteen years at the helm, he posted seven non-winning
seasons, an unexpectedly high number for a manager who was able to
stay in one place for so long. He was able to make the most out of a
season when his teams were very talented, however. In 1979, the
Dodgers produced their first losing season under Lasorda, yet two
years later the Dodgers won the World Series. Similarly, the Dodgers
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were 16 games under .500 in both 1986 and 1987 but managed to
defeat the Oakland Athletics in the World Series in 1988. It seems that
Lasorda was able to use World Series success to excuse many losing
seasons in the eyes of those in the organization that made manager
retention decisions.
This occurrence can also be seen league wide as a whole. Since 1930,
a manager who has won a World Series during his tenure with the club
served an average of 3.18 seasons. Meanwhile, managers who won a
World Series during their tenure served an average of 7.38 years.
On top of this, it seems to be very important for managers to avoid
consecutive losing seasons. Table 5 shows the number of occurrences
of consecutive seasons with losing records league wide since 1930 and
the number of times a manager was not retained following these
streaks.
While it is undoubtedly important for a manager’s job security to avoid
consecutive losing seasons, it also appears that this degree of
importance varies among small-, midsize-, and large-market teams, as
presented in Table 6 and Figure 3, since 1988. For the purposes of this
study, a large-market team is defined as a team in the top third of the
league in total payroll. Meanwhile, a midsize-market team is in the
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second-third of the league in total payroll, and a small-market team is
in the bottom third. Although it is a small sample size, these numbers
are especially glaring when analyzing two consecutive losing seasons
for large-market teams and three consecutive losing seasons for
midsize- and large-market teams. When a team in the upper third of
the league in payroll has two consecutive losing seasons, a managerial
change has occurred more than 58 percent of the time. Similarly, any
streak of three consecutive seasons with a losing record will likely
result in a change but especially for midsize- and large- market teams
who, when combined statistically, saw change in over 53 percent of
occurrences.
Similarly, a playoff drought of three seasons likely signals an end of
tenure for the manager of a large-market team. These statistics are
shown in Table 7 and Figure 4. While a clear pattern does not emerge
in any of the other cases presented, the manager of a large-market
team has only retained his job in six of the fifteen instances in which
he has experienced three consecutive seasons without a playoff
appearance.
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Another piece to analyze is the effect of attendance on an executive’s
managerial retention decision.3 Eliminating seasons in which play
began in new ballparks, total season attendance increased by an
average of 36,179.28 in seasons in which the manager was retained
for the next season. Conversely, in seasons in which the manager was
not retained, total season attendance decreased by an average of
1,128,70.7. While it could be argued that fewer wins led to the
decreased attendance and fewer wins is what contributed to the
decision to change managers, it is still useful to note that decreased
attendance did occur in the seasons prior to these decisions, and the
attendance change was a piece of information available to decision
makers. Undoubtedly, these decision makers dislike attendance
decreases, as they have negative effects on their ability to create
revenue.
While these numbers are informative to a degree, looking at likelihood
of manager retention using only one variable at a time gives an
incomplete picture of the managerial retention decision-making
process. Manager retention decisions are made with the whole picture
and many variables in mind. Results of previous seasons,
championships won in previous seasons, performance of the team with
3 Attendance data is taken from Sean Lahman’s online database.
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respect to other teams in the league, a team’s expectations,
improvement from year to year, and attendance fluctuations are all
included in the decision making process. It is impossible to determine
which on-field factors carry the most weight without performing some
type of regression analysis. Also, no definitive conclusions can be
made regarding this data without taking into account other factors,
such as age of the manager and his interim status. These factors will
be evaluated in Section V in hopes of producing a model of manager
retention.
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V. A MODEL OF MANAGER RETENTION
A possible function that explains the probability of a manager
returning to a team the following year is
Max (p) retention = f (g, a, c, e, i, b, X) where
g indicates performance of the manager’s team relative to other teams
in the league
a indicates performance of the team in a manager’s prior years of
service
c indicates the existence of extraordinary, championship caliber
performance in a manager’s prior years of service
e indicates the fans’ impressions of the team under the current
manager
i indicates whether or not a manager served with an interim tag
b indicates the age of the manager
X is a vector of other circumstances that are involved in the manager
retention decision making process, including relationship of the
manager with upper management and other relevant controls
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In this study, I will perform a regression analysis to further investigate
the manager retention decisions in Major League Baseball. The
regression will hopefully allow us to better quantify the impact of the
specific factors that are involved in this decision-making process.
The sample for the study of manager retention consists of 778
observations. These observations represent the season of every
serving Major League manager since 1988, midseason replacements
included. For the purposes of this study, an interim manager serving
after a midseason change has one observation that denotes his team’s
performance in the fraction of the season in which he was at the helm.
Summary statistics are provided in Table 8.
The measure of a team’s performance relative to other teams in the
league is the number of games back a team finds itself from its
division leader at the end of the year. Because playoff appearances are
awarded based on the finish of a team within its division, I used the
team with the best record in each division in a given year as the
standard for comparison. Also, when a manager only served a fraction
of the year, I averaged his win percentage out over the course of the
year to determine, in theory, what his record would be over a full
schedule and then used this proportioned win total to determine how
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many games back the team would have found itself had this win total
occurred over the full course of the season.
The measures of a team’s performance in prior years are binary
variables indicating consecutive losing seasons. I included binary
variables for a losing season, two consecutive losing seasons, and
three consecutive losing seasons, where 1 indicates the presence of a
streak and 0 indicates the absence of a streak. Also included is a
binary variable indicating whether or not a manager produced a World
Series championship with the team within a five year period, as this
recent championship may have had some impact on decision-makers.
Again, the binary variable 1 indicates the presence of a World Series
championship in the past five years, while the variable 0 indicates the
absence of a championship.
I also included a binary variable indicating the presence or absence of
a playoff berth earned by the manager with the team within a three
year, four year, and five year time period. This variable is another
indicator of recent success.
The measure of the presence of an interim tag is a binary variable
indicating whether or not a manager was a midseason replacement,
with 1 indicating a midseason replacement.
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Also included is a measure of the fans’ approval of the team. This is
measured using attendance figures for each team. The variable is
calculated using attendance in a given year as compared to the
average attendance seen in the previous three years. To correct for
newly built ballparks and increased capacities, a team’s attendance
figures are calculated as a percentage of full capacity.
The final dependent variable is a measure of a manager’s age during
the season. This is included in hopes of capturing some of the
managerial changes caused by simply a manager deciding on his own
to leave the team for retirement.
The independent variable for this study is a binary variable with 1
representing a change in manager the following season and 0
representing a manager’s return to the same team the following
season. Given the binary nature of this variable, I used a probit
regression model. According to Dhrymes (1978), the probit model is
useful when dealing with binary response variables.
Table 9 shows the results of the probit regression estimating the
probability of manager retention given season performance, previous
seasons’ performance, presence of an interim tag, fans’ impressions of
the team, and the age of the manager.
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The positive sign on the games back variable shows that the more
poorly a team does with respect to the other teams in the division, the
more unlikely it is for a manager to return. The variables indicating
one losing season and two consecutive losing seasons are not
significant; however, the variable indicating three consecutive losing
seasons is significant. The sign on this variable is positive showing that
it is important for managers to avoid these long streaks of consecutive
losing seasons if they hope to keep their jobs. Also, the variable
indicating a World Series championship in the past five years is
negative and significant, showing that extraordinary, championship
caliber performance in the recent past is a criterion for decision
makers in the manager retention process. Also, the variable indicating
a midseason replacement is positive and significant at the ten percent
level showing that it is harder for managers to overcome the interim
tag when trying to return to their team the following season. The age
of a manager is also significant at the ten percent level, again showing
that as the age of a manager increases the likelihood of him returning
to the same team the following season decreases.
32
VI. CONCLUSION
From the previous discussion, it is undoubtedly true that, without good
players, a manager cannot be successful. Recent playoff history, in
which eighty percent of teams in the top ten percent of payrolls
reached the playoff from 2004-2008, demonstrates the factuality of
this claim. Furthermore, testimonials from an experienced manager
like Earl Weaver do the same. Weaver was able to manage the same
Major League team for seventeen seasons. After all of these seasons
of gaining experience and learning about the game, he still fervently
argues that the key to any team’s success and, in turn, any manager’s
success is having talented, productive players. A manager can do a
great deal to put these players in the right positions to produce, but in
the end it is the players that win games.
Still, looking at previous managerial history, it is apparent that the
field manager is, in many cases, held responsible for the failure of a
team on the field. Just as in the business community, in which
executives of firms that are performing at a low level make similar
decisions to executives of firms that are performing at a high level,
baseball managers make congruent decisions across the board also.
Even so, both CEOs and baseball managers are still held accountable
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for the success or failure of a firm or team. Both are judged heavily on
performance. In the case of the CEO, profits are the decisive factor;
whereas, wins and losses are the main difference maker with respect
to the baseball manager. These wins and losses are used heavily in the
decision making process for the retention of these managers.
According to the model presented, it appears that the most significant
factor that is used in this process is team performance in the current
year as compared to the performance of the best team in the division.
This “games back from the division leader” variable is the most
strongly significant and strongly positive variable in the study. Also,
the occurrence of a prolonged, consecutive period of sustained losing
is a significant factor that seems to contribute to the decision to make
a managerial change. This occurrence is seen as teams that
experience three consecutive seasons of losing records are more likely
to have a different manager in place to begin the following year. Older
aged managers and managers who began employment in the middle
of a season are less likely to be retained the following season as well.
One factor that appears to help a manager be retained is recent
success at the highest level. Just as managers with a World Series
championship during their tenure with a club spend an average of 7.38
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years while managers without a championship serve an average of
3.18 years, the probit regression model also shows a positive, direct
relationship between the probability of managerial retention and the
presence of a World Series championship in the previous five years of
a manager’s term.
In short, the likelihood of a manager’s retention is dependent on his
team’s success in the win/loss column. Managers that win baseball
games tend to stay with their teams for long periods of time. While
this may sound simple, the execution of this goal is difficult, as
evidenced by the numerous recent examples of managers being fired
in the middle of a season or after a season is completed. These firings
will, undoubtedly, continue into the future as well. The hope for each
manager is that his upper management and scouting department will
provide him with a team of highly skilled, highly talented professional
players that are capable of producing at a high level. It is then up to
the manager to put these players into positions that will maximize
their production level. Then they hope that this production will lead to
enough wins and championships that allow the manager to remain
employed.
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Table 1. Average Age of MLB Managers by Year, 1988-2011
Year Average Age Year Average Age
1988 50.06 2000 52.83
1989 48.43 2001 52.86
1990 49.81 2002 52.03
1991 48.50 2003 52.69
1992 47.77 2004 51.91
1993 48.83 2005 53.06
1994 49.45 2006 53.63
1995 49.90 2007 53.18
1996 50.15 2008 53.09
1997 50.10 2009 53.53
1998 50.09 2010 54.38
1999 51.91 2011 55.39


























































Table 2. Average Managerial Tenure Length by Decade

























1930 16 3 1965 20 5 2000 30 6
1931 16 3 1966 20 3 2001 30 6
1932 16 2 1967 20 6 2002 29 10
1933 16 5 1968 20 4 2003 30 3
1934 16 2 1969 24 7 2004 30 4
1935 16 0 1970 24 2 2005 30 5
1936 16 1 1971 24 4 2006 30 7
1937 16 6 1972 24 4 2007 30 5
1938 16 4 1973 24 6 2008 30 2
1939 16 2 1974 24 1 2009 30 2
1940 16 2 1975 24 8 2010 30 7
1941 16 3 1976 24 8 2011 30 7
1942 16 4 1977 26 3
1943 16 4 1978 26 5
1944 15 0 1979 26 7
1945 16 2 1980 26 6
1946 16 5 1981 26 6
1947 15 5 1982 26 7
1948 16 3 1983 26 5
1949 16 3 1984 26 7
1950 16 5 1985 26 6
1951 16 3 1986 26 4
1952 16 1 1987 26 4
1953 16 5 1988 25 6
1954 16 7 1989 26 2
1955 16 3 1990 26 0
1956 16 4 1991 26 8
1957 16 1 1992 26 4
1958 16 2 1993 28 2
1959 16 4 1994 28 6
1960 15 5 1995 28 6
1961 18 2 1996 28 6
1962 20 5 1997 28 3
1963 20 3 1998 30 4
1964 20 6 1999 30 7
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Arizona 2.60 Milwaukee 2.80
Atlanta 3.48 Minnesota 4.47
Baltimore 2.81 New York (AL) 3.33
Boston 3.62 New York (NL) 3.27
Chicago (AL) 3.66 Oakland 3.92
Chicago (NL) 2.75 Philadelphia 3.08
Cincinnati 2.70 Pittsburgh 4.26
Cleveland 2.70 San Diego 2.80
Colorado 3.60 Seattle 2.43
Detroit 3.17 San Francisco 4.37
Florida 2.00 St. Louis 4.30
Houston 3.06 Tampa Bay 3.25








Table 5. Probability of Managerial Change Following Consecutive Losing
Seasons, by Year from 1930-2011





1932 0.50 0.67 0.50
1933 0.88 0.50 1.00
1934 0.50 1.00 1.00
1935 0.00 0.00 --
1936 0.14 0.17 0.25
1937 0.33 0.50 0.50
1938 0.57 0.50 0.50
1939 0.17 0.00 0.00
1940 0.14 0.00 0.00
1941 0.44 0.50 0.40
1942 0.44 0.60 0.67
1943 0.29 0.50 0.50
1944 0.00 0.00 0.00
1945 0.33 0.50 0.50
1946 0.44 0.67 0.50
1947 0.43 0.50 --
1948 0.50 0.75 1.00
1949 0.38 0.67 1.00
1950 0.29 0.33 0.00
1951 0.33 0.40 0.50
1952 0.83 1.00 1.00
1953 0.57 -- --
1954 0.60 0.50 --
1955 0.29 0.50 1.00
1956 0.13 0.25 1.00
1957 0.67 0.75 1.00
1958 0.38 0.00 --
1959 0.67 0.50 1.00
1960 0.71 0.00 0.00
1961 0.44 1.00 1.00
1962 0.50 0.50 --
1963 0.33 0.33 1.00
1964 0.50 0.80 0.50
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1965 0.44 0.67 1.00
1966 0.33 0.50 0.00
1967 0.56 0.75 1.00
1968 0.56 0.50 1.00
1969 0.56 1.00 --
1970 0.25 0.00 --
1971 0.18 0.14 0.33
1972 0.64 0.80 0.80
1973 0.33 0.00 0.00
1974 0.36 0.50 0.50
1975 0.62 0.50 1.00
1976 0.50 0.50 0.00
1977 0.58 0.75 0.50
1978 0.25 0.00 --
1979 0.60 0.40 0.50
1980 0.58 0.50 0.50
1981 0.90 1.00 1.00
1982 0.55 -- --
1983 0.38 0.75 --
1984 0.54 0.67 --
1985 0.45 0.67 1.00
1986 0.64 1.00 --
1987 0.36 0.00 --
1988 0.56 0.75 1.00
1989 0.27 1.00 --
1990 0.27 0.20 --
1991 0.70 0.80 1.00
1992 0.23 1.00 --
1993 0.17 0.25 --
1994 0.28 0.33 1.00
1995 0.31 0.27 0.20
1996 0.38 0.44 0.50
1997 0.25 0.29 0.50
1998 0.19 0.14 0.25
1999 0.33 0.20 0.20
2000 0.14 0.25 0.33
2001 0.36 0.56 0.60
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2002 0.60 0.50 0.50
2003 0.17 0.50 0.50
2004 0.29 0.14 0.00
2005 0.50 0.86 0.75
2006 0.31 0.50 0.00
2007 0.36 0.80 --
2008 0.08 0.00 --
2009 0.29 0.14 0.50
2010 0.71 1.00 1.00
2011 0.00 0.00 --
Table 6. Probability of Managerial Change, by Market Size of Team





Large 0.377 0.583 1.000
Midsize 0.343 0.389 0.500
Small 0.279 0.388 0.467
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Figure 3. Probability of Managerial Change, by Market Size of Team
Table 7. Probability of Managerial Change After Years of Absence from
the Playoffs, by Market Size of Team
Size One Year Two Years Three Years
Small 0.1395 0.3125 0.4324
Midsize 0.2099 0.3214 0.3704












Figure 4. Probability of Managerial Change After Years of Absence from









One Year Two Years Three Years
Small Mid Large
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Table 8. Summary Statistics for Probit Regression Model of Managerial
Retention Decision Making Process
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Mgr Change 776 0.2590 0.4384 0 1
Games Back 776 15.0509 12.6828 0 64
Losing Season 776 0.3015 0.4592 0 1
Two Consecutive Losing
Seasons
776 0.1263 0.3324 0 1
Three Consecutive
Losing Seasons
776 0.0941 0.2921 0 1
World Series Win (Past 5
yrs)
776 0.1211 0.3265 0 1
Playoff Appearance
(Past 3 yrs)
776 0.2861 0.4522 0 1
Playoff Appearance
(past 4 yrs)
776 0.2552 0.4362 0 1
Playoff Appearance
(past 5 yrs)
776 0.2113 0.4085 0 1
Age 776 51.5039 7.4790 35 81
Interim 776 0.1186 0.3235 0 1
Attendance Change 776 .6168 .2087 -.8166 .12237
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Table 9. Probit Regression Model of Managerial Retention Decision
Making Process
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Z P>|z|
Games Back 0.0280 0.062 4.50 0.000***
Losing Season 0.0596 0.164 0.36 0.717
Two Consecutive Losing
Seasons
0.1362 0.204 0.67 0.504
Three Consecutive
Losing Seasons
0.5817 0.219 2.66 0.008***
World Series Win (Past 5
yrs)
-0.5895 0.208 -2.83 0.005***
Playoff Appearance
(Past 3 yrs)
0.1526 0.200 0.76 0.446
Playoff Appearance
(past 4 yrs)
0.2721 0.252 1.08 0.279
Playoff Appearance
(past 5 yrs)
-0.3453 0.223 -1.55 0.121
Age 0.0123 0.007 1.75 0.079**
Interim 0.3010 0.163 1.84 0.065**
Attendance Change -9.56x10-6 2.71x10-5 -0.35 0.724
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